a b s t r a c t A large body of literature agrees that persons with schizophrenia suffer from a Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit. However, most empirical studies have focused on third-person, egocentric ToM, underestimating other facets of this complex cognitive skill. Aim of this research is to examine the ToM of schizophrenic persons considering its various aspects (first-vs. second-order, first-vs. third-person, egocentric vs. allocentric, beliefs vs. desires vs. positive emotions vs. negative emotions and how each of these mental state types may be dealt with), to determine whether some components are more impaired than others. We developed a Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) and administered it to 22 persons with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and a matching control group. Th.o.-m.a.s. is a semi-structured interview which allows a multi-component measurement of ToM. Both groups were also administered a few existing ToM tasks and the schizophrenic subjects were administered the Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale and the WAIS-R. The schizophrenic persons performed worse than control at all the ToM measurements; however, these deficits appeared to be differently distributed among different components of ToM.
a b s t r a c t
A large body of literature agrees that persons with schizophrenia suffer from a Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit. However, most empirical studies have focused on third-person, egocentric ToM, underestimating other facets of this complex cognitive skill. Aim of this research is to examine the ToM of schizophrenic persons considering its various aspects (first-vs. second-order, first-vs. third-person, egocentric vs. allocentric, beliefs vs. desires vs. positive emotions vs. negative emotions and how each of these mental state types may be dealt with), to determine whether some components are more impaired than others. We developed a Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) and administered it to 22 persons with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and a matching control group. Th.o.-m.a.s. is a semi-structured interview which allows a multi-component measurement of ToM. Both groups were also administered a few existing ToM tasks and the schizophrenic subjects were administered the Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale and the WAIS-R. The schizophrenic persons performed worse than control at all the ToM measurements; however, these deficits appeared to be differently distributed among different components of ToM.
Our conclusion is that ToM deficits are not unitary in schizophrenia, which also testifies to the importance of a complete and articulated investigation of ToM.
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Introduction
Theory of Mind (ToM) was initially defined by Premack and Woodruff (1978) as the ability to ascribe mental states to oneself and the others and to use this knowledge to predict and explain the relevant actions and behaviors. Frith (1992 Frith ( , 1994 advanced the hypothesis that underlying the complex symptomatology of schizophrenia may be a deficit of ToM. In Frith's account, the symptoms of schizophrenia-whether positive, like delirium and hallucinations. or negative, like apathy and anhedonia-are consequences of, or reactions to, a breakdown of the ability to handle the mental states of one's own and of the others.
A large body of empirical evidence appears to support Frith's hypothesis: schizophrenic subjects perform worse than normal at several types of ToM tasks (Corcoran, Mercer, & Frith, 1995; Doody, Götz, Johnstone, Frith, & Cunningham Owens, 1998; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Mazza, De Risio, Surian, Roncone, & Casacchia, 2001; Mazza, De Risio, Tozzini, Roncone, & mental states, both of her own and of the others. Beside what has been discussed in the previous section, another major reason why Th.o.m.a.s. has such structure is the standpoint that we adopt in the ongoing theoretical discussion concerning the very nature and ''functioning" of ToM. In brief, the problem is whether ToM consists of an explicit, formal, substantially linguistic form of reasoning or also (or only) of other, less theorematic and less local activities (Gallagher, 2001; Gallagher & Hutto, 2008; Zahavi, 2005) .
There is no space to discuss the issue here, nor is it the focus of this paper (but see Tirassa & Bosco, 2008; Tirassa, Bosco, & Colle, 2006b) . We have little doubt that, as humans, we can engage in highly complex ToM reasoning when we need or want to, as it happens when a general attempts to foresee and understand what his opponent's strategies will be on the battlefield; yet, there can be as little doubt that we do not explicitly represent and reason about the mental states of anybody who happens to smile and say hello to us or to be drinking a double whiskey in the bar where we are eating a sandwich. In the latter cases, we are not making any theory about the other's mental states (or even about those of our own), and we may hardly ever notice that there is a social activity going on in which we are immersed. Yet, our mental activities are not devoid of a social, mentalizing flavor-our observations of or actions toward these individuals are fully informed by our comprehension that the former is treating us gently, and that the latter is a thirsty customer of the bar. This is why we are ready to smile and shake hands with the one, or to understand why the other is beginning to mutter about having lost a job and a spouse.
Th.o.m.a.s. builds on the idea that the human mentalizing abilities are basically a way to look at the world, a background which informs our whole social life and against which more explicit, theory-driven reasoning episodes become possible and meaningful. We felt that an interview would be more appropriate to let such worldview emerge, without focusing too much on the more formal, theorematic activities that may or may not be employed moment by moment by an individual, particularly one with a mental problem.
The interview is originally in Italian. The questions of which it is composed (see Appendix A) are organized along four scales, each focusing on one of the knowledge domains in which a person's ToM may manifest itself.
Scale A, I-Me. It investigates the interviewee's knowledge of her own mental states. The viewpoint of the questions is centered on the interviewee (I) reflecting on her own mental states (Me), (e.g., ''Do you ever experience emotions that make you feel good?"). This scale investigates first-person ToM in an egocentric perspective. Scale B, Other-Self. It investigates the knowledge that, according to the interviewee, the other persons have of their own mental states, independently of the subject's perspective. The viewpoint of the questions is centered on the other persons (Other) reflecting on their own mental states (Self), (e.g., ''Do the others try to fulfill their wishes?"). This scale investigates third-person ToM in an allocentric perspective. Scale C, I-Other. It investigates the interviewee's knowledge of the mental states of other persons. The viewpoint of the questions is centered on the interviewee (I) reflecting on the others' mental states (Other) (e.g., ''Do you notice it when the others feel good?"). This scale is similar to scale B in that they both investigate third-person ToM; however, while the perspective there is centered on the other, here it is centered on the interviewee. In other words, here the subject is asked to take an egocentric perspective. Scale D, Other-Me. It investigates the knowledge that, from the interviewee's point of view, the others have of her mental states. The viewpoint of the questions is centered on the other persons (Other) reflecting on the mental states of the interviewee (Me) (e.g., ''Do the others notice it when you feel good?"). This scale can be compared with a second-order ToM task, in that the abstract form of the questions is: ''What do you think that the others think that you think?".
Each scale is divided into three subscales that, respectively, explore the dimensions of Awareness, Relation and Realization of mental states:
Awareness. It investigates the interviewee's ability to perceive and differentiate beliefs, desires and emotions in herself and in the others. Recognizing different types of mental states is a necessary precondition of understanding their links and causal relations with one another and with the external world. Relation. It investigates the interviewee's ability to recognize causal relations between different mental states and between them and the resulting behaviors. For example: ''When you feel bad, do you feel you understand why?". Being capable to connect and to integrate different mental states and to understand their reciprocal relations and bi-directional connections with perceptions and actions is necessary to draw up an explanatory theory of the mind and of the social world. Realization. It investigates the interviewee's ability to adopt effective strategies to achieve a desired state. For example: ''Do you succeed in getting what you want? How?". To act adaptively requires not only to have a theory of the causal relations between mental states and between the mental states and the world, but also to know how to use this knowledge to appropriately and successfully affect the mental states and the behavior of one's own and of the others.
Based on current theorizing on the most important types of mental states that an agent's cognitive architecture has to comprise (Tirassa, 1999; Tirassa & Bosco, 2008) , the questions focus on the interviewee's perspectives on epistemic states (knowledge, beliefs and so on), volitional states (desires, intentions and so on) and positive and negative emotions.
In a graphic representation of the structure of the interview (see Appendix B), the four scales and their subscales are the columns of a table whose rows represent the types of mental states investigated. Thus, each cell of the table represents a specific intersection of two of the dimensions that the interview considers. Each question in its turn refers to a specific cell of the table, that is it encourages the interviewee to express her understanding of the relevant aspect of the activities of the mind.
For example, question [1] : ''Do you happen to experience emotions that make you feel good?" explores the ability to identify one's own positive emotions (dimensions investigated: Awareness and Positive emotions). Question [7] : ''Do you happen to have wishes, and know what you want?" encourages the interviewee to express her awareness of her own desires (dimensions investigated: Awareness and Desires). Analogous considerations can be made for each question. This structure is replicated for all four scales. Wherever appropriate, the interviewee is asked to provide one or more episodic examples.
In line with the current literature, we expected the schizophrenic subjects to show an impaired ToM when compared with control. However, we expected some aspects of their ToM to be better preserved than others. In particular, their score at scale A (I-Me), which assesses first-person ToM, may significantly differ from that at scale B (Other-Self), which evaluates third-person ToM.
We also investigated possible differences in the subjects' performance at scales B (Other-Self) and C (I-Other): both investigate third-person ToM, but the former takes an allocentric perspective and the latter an egocentric one.
Finally, we investigated possible differences between scales A, B, and C, which investigate first-order ToM, and scale D, which investigates second-order ToM.
Methods

Participants
Twenty-two persons with a diagnosis of schizophrenia according to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) helped us to collect the present data. All participants were outpatients of the San Gerardo Hospital of Monza (Psychosocial Center of Besana Brianza). All participants were native speakers of Italian. None was acutely or florid psychotic: all were tested in their chronic phase. The DSM-IV sub-types were so distributed: paranoid (11 subjects), undifferentiated (4 subjects), disorganized (3 subjects), residual (4 subjects). The subjects were receiving medication: 9 received typical medicine (haloperidol and methotrimeprazine, a.k.a. levomepromazine), 11 atypical (clozapine, quetiapine, risperidone and olanzapine), 2 both typical and atypical. The mean of illness onset was 25.86 years (standard deviation-SD = 6.18) and the mean duration of illness was 13.73 (SD = 6.47).
Inclusion criterion for schizophrenic subjects was IQ > 70, evaluated with the WAIS-R 1 ; their mean IQ was 90 ± 15. The symptomatology of the schizophrenic subjects at the time of testing was investigated with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS: Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987) . It consists of 30 items subdivided into three scales: one for positive symptoms (7 items), one for negative symptoms (7 items) and a general psychopathology scale (16 items); each item is assessed on a 7-points scale ranging from ''absent" (1) to ''extremely serious" (7) . The subjects' mean scores were: Negative symptoms 25.86 (SD = 6.18), Positive symptoms 7.5 (SD = 4.65), General symptoms 45.00 (SD = 12.47).
A control group of healthy persons was also included in the study. The two groups were matched for sex (schizophrenic subjects: 12 females, 10 males; controls: 12 females, 10 males), age (schizophrenic subjects: mean = 39.59 ± 9.51; controls: mean = 38.5 ± 9.8), and years of formal education (schizophrenic subjects: mean = 10.4 ± 3.35; controls: mean = 10.18 ± 3.06).
Exclusion criteria for both schizophrenic subjects and controls included an anamnesis of neurological or neuropsychological disease, leucotomy, head injury, and substance or alcohol abuse (both defined as per DSM-IV).
Materials and procedures
In addition to Th.o.m.a.s., the following ToM tests were administered in vivo to both the schizophrenic subjects and the controls.
Sally and Ann (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) . The experimenter, holding a doll named Sally and one named Ann, says: ''Sally places her ball in the basket and leaves the scene. Ann moves the ball from the basket to the box". While speaking, the experimenter acts out the corresponding gestures and then asks the subject: ''When Sally comes back, where will she think her ball is?" Smarties modified (cigarettes). This is a modified version (Pickup & Frith, 2001 ) of the original Smarties task (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987) . The experimenter shows the subject a cigarette pack and asks: ''What is inside this?". Of course the subject answers: ''Cigarettes". The experimenter then opens the pack, shows that it contains pencils instead, closes it again and asks: ''When the nurse enters, what will she think is inside?" Strange Stories (Happé, Brownell, & Winner, 1999) . We presented a selection of six Strange Stories, excluding those that require the comprehension of communicative acts like metaphors and irony. An example is the following story: ''A burglar who has just robbed a shop is making his getaway. As he is running home, a policeman on his beat sees him drop his glove. He doesn't know the man is a burglar, he just wants to tell him he dropped his glove. But when the policeman shouts out to the burglar, 'Hey, you! Stop', the burglar turns round, sees the policeman and gives himself up. He puts his hands up and admits that he did the break-in at the local shop." The subject is asked: ''Why did the burglar do that?" A correct interpretation of the situation requires to assess the burglar's mental state and to realize that he misunderstood the policeman's intention, which was to give back the glove.
With the authorization of the interviewees, all Th.o.m.a.s. interviews (subjects and controls) were tape-recorded and then transcribed. 2 The transcriptions were rated by two independent judges, who had not participated to the interviewing phase and were blind to whether each person whose answers they were coding belonged to the experimental or the control group. Each judge was asked to assign each answer a score from 0 to 4, according to the given rating criteria (see Appendix C), and to insert it in the relevant cell of the correction grid (see Appendix B).
The two judges reached a significant level of inter-reliability on their first judgments of the schizophrenic subjects' and the control subjects' answers, considered separately, both considering the total Th.o.m.a.s. scores (Correlation Coefficient: correlation ranging from .83 to .86, p < .001) and each subscale (Correlation Coefficient: correlation ranging from .81 to .91, p < .001). For the final score assignment they discussed each item upon which they disagreed until a full agreement was reached.
The two judges also scored the other ToM tests, following the relevant criteria available in the literature, assigning 0 to each incorrect answer and 1 to each correct one. Fig. 1 shows the mean scores for the schizophrenic subjects and the controls to each Th.o.m.a.s. scale. We performed an ANOVA with two levels on between factors (subject group: subjects vs. controls) and four levels on within factors (scale type: A, I-Me; B, Other-Self; C, Me-Other; D, Other-Me). As expected, there was a significant main effect of subject group (F 1,38 = 5.09, p < .001) and a main effect of scale type (F 3,114 = 8.55, p < .001). Fig. 1 reveals that the subjects performed worse than the controls at all scale types. The interaction between subjects and scale type was not significant. Fig. 2 shows the mean scores for the schizophrenic subjects and the controls to each Th.o.m.a.s. subscale. We performed an ANOVA with two levels on between factors (subject group: subjects vs. controls) and three levels on within subjects factors (subscale type: Awareness, Relation, Realization). Again as expected, there was a significant main effect of subject group (F 1,38 = 34.90, p < .001) and a main effect of subscale type (F 2,76 = 5.71, p = .0049). Fig. 2 reveals that the subjects performed worse that the controls at all subscale types. The interaction between subject and subscale type was significant too (F 2,76 = 5.72, p = .015). Fig. 3 shows the mean scores for the schizophrenic subjects and the controls to each Th.o.m.a.s. dimension. We performed an ANOVA with two levels on between factors (subject group: subjects vs. controls) and four levels on within subjects factors (dimension type: Desires, Beliefs, Positive emotions, Negative emotions). Again as expected, there was a significant main effect of subject group (F 1,38 = 36.17, p < .001) and a main effect of dimension type (F 3,114 = 5.37, p = .0017). Fig. 3 reveals that the subjects performed worse than controls at all dimension types. The interaction between subjects and dimension type was not significant.
Results
Between-groups differences
Finally, the overall performance at the conventional ToM tasks was 69% of correct answers for the subjects and 95% for the controls; as expected, this difference was significant (T test: t = 3.75, p = .0012). 2 Technical problems occurred in recording part of two subjects' interview. These data are traited as missing values. 
Schizophrenic subjects' performance at Th.o.m.a.s
Focusing on the schizophrenics' performance at Th.o.m.a.s., we conducted a within subjects ANOVA with four levels on within subjects factors (scale type: A, I-Me; B, Other-Self; C, Me-Other; D, Other-Me). We found significant differences between the schizophrenics' mean scores at the four individual scales (F 3,57 = 5.95, p = .001, see Fig. 1 ). In particular, as expected, post hoc pairwise comparison (Bonferroni corrected: p ranging from p = .027 to p = .028) revealed that the subjects scored higher at scale A (I-Me), which assesses first-person ToM, than at all the other three scales: B (Other-Self) and C (Me-Other), both of which assess third-person ToM, and D (Other-Me), which assesses ToM with a second-level inference. No significant differences existed between the latter three scales.
We also conducted a within subjects ANOVA with three levels on within subjects factors (subscale type: Awareness, Relation, Realization) that revealed a significant difference between the schizophrenics' total mean performance at the three subscales (F 2,38 = 6.64, p = .003) (see Fig. 2 ). In particular, post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the subjects scored higher at the Awareness subscale than at the Relation subscale (Bonferroni corrected: p < .001), while there was no significant difference between the others.
For explorative purposes, we investigated whether differences existed between the schizophrenic subjects' total mean performance at the four dimensions (Beliefs, Desires, Positive emotions, Negative emotions) but found none (within subjects ANOVA: F 3,57 = 2.72, p = .053) (see Fig. 3 ).
Correlations within the schizophrenics' group
We investigated the correlations between the schizophrenics subjects' scores at Th.o.m.a.s. and at the conventional ToM tests, finding that there existed both with the Th.o.m.a.s. total score (Correlation = .54, p = .013) and with scales A, B, and C (Correlation: ranging from .045 to .065, p ranging from .0013 to .033). No correlation was instead found with scale D (Correlation = .41, p = .073) (see Table 1 ). We also found a correlation between the schizophrenic subjects' IQ and their mean scores both at Th.o.m.a.s. total (Correlation = 57, p = .0072) and at scales B, C and D (Correlation ranging from .48 to .70, p ranging from .02 to .0004), while none was found with scale A (Correlation = .27, p = .23).
We ruled out a correlation between the schizophrenic subjects' years of education and their mean scores at either Th.o.-m.a.s. total and at scales A, B, and C (Correlation ranging from .22 to 40, p ranging from .07 to .32), with the exception of scale D (Correlation = .53, p = .014).
Finally, we correlated the PANSS score and the Th.o.m.a.s. score: significant correlations are reported in Table 1 .
Conclusions
The Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) is meant to provide a more articulated and thorough investigation of ToM than those available in the literature. It provides specific and comparable measures of ToM within a unitary framework, taking into account the distinctions between first-and second-order, between the first-and the third-person, between the egocentric and the allocentric perspective, and between different types of mental states and how each of them may be dealt with. In addition, it provides a direct inquiry of how the interviewee views her capability to understand and deal with her own mental states and those of the others.
In line with Frith (1992) hypotheses, we found an impaired ToM to be associated with schizophrenia. The global Th.o.m.a.s. score of the schizophrenic subjects we examined was worse than control, as was their performance at each of the four scales (A, B, C and D), at each of the three subscales (Awareness, Relation, and Realization), and at each of the four types of mental state assessed (Beliefs, Desires, Positive emotions, and Negative emotions). Globally, our results are aligned with the literature, showing a ToM deficit in schizophrenia (for overviews see Casacchia, Mazza, & Roncone,2004; Harrington, Siegert, & McClure, 2005) .
However, in line with our hypothesis, we found that schizophrenic subjects show a variegated performance to questions that, albeit conceived and formulated in similar ways and within a unitary framework, involve different aspects of ToM: some ToM abilities, however impaired with respect to controls, turned out to be better preserved than others: on the average, schizophrenic subjects scored higher at scale A, which assesses first-person ToM, than at scales B and C, which assess third-person ToM. They scored equally at the latter two, which means that their performance did not differ whether the questions concerning third-person ToM took an allocentric (scale B) or an egocentric (scale C) perspective. This supports the ideas that first-person ToM is better preserved in schizophrenia than third-person ToM and that there are no significant differences in this respect between egocentric and allocentric perspective.
Whether humans are better at reasoning in the first-or in the third-person is a current matter of hot debate. Our results support hypothesis Goldman (1993) that they can better reason about their own mental states than about those of the others.
Other researchers, however, argue in favor of the opposite view (e.g., Gopnik, 1993) . On interviewing schizophrenics about their delusions, Gambini et al. (2004) found that they performed better at the third-person than at the first. The relevant questions were ''Do you really think that what you just told me is real? Do you have any doubt about it?" or ''If you were me, would you consider reasonable what you just told me? If someone else told you what you just told me, would you believe them?" However, the better performance at the latter questions than at the former could be explained by the subjects' experience that doctors, family members and, in general, the other persons do not consider their delusions plausible or reasonable, rather than by a truly better capability of reasoning about the others' mind.
Further research thus appears to be needed regarding first-vs. third-person ToM. Finally, the schizophrenic subjects performed at scale D worse than at scale A: this is not surprising, because the latter requires a first-order inference while the former requires a second-order one. As regards the three Th.o.m.a.s. subscales (Awareness, Relation, and Realization), the schizophrenic subjects' mean performance at the Awareness subscale is significantly higher than that at the Relation subscale. This suggests that, at least limitedly to our experimental paradigm, their ability to be aware of and reflect upon mental states is impaired-as shown by the comparison with the control group-but less than their ability to understand the causal links that mental states have with each other and with behavior. Reasonably, relation and realization appear to be more complex than the mere recognition of inner states. No significant difference emerged from the other comparisons between the subscales or from the comparison between the four mental states types explored (Beliefs, Desires, Positive emotions, and Negative emotions).
A significant correlation existed between standard ToM tests (Sally and Ann, Cigarettes, and Strange Stories) and both the overall Th.o.m.a.s. score and scales A, B and C. This correlation does not exist with scale D (Other-Me): this is not surprising because D assesses second-order ToM, which is not specifically investigated by any of the conventional ToM test we used.
The schizophrenic subjects' IQ had a significant correlation both with the total Th.o.m.a.s. scores and with scales B (OtherSelf), C (I-Other), and D (Other-Me), but not A (I-Me), probably because the latter is the easiest.
The relation between ToM and IQ in schizophrenia has been investigated in the literature, but not with univocal results. Doody et al. (1998) found that the schizophrenics' deficit in second-order ToM did not correlate with their IQ, while Pickup and Frith (2001) found a ToM impairment only in a second-order task and it was associated with low IQ. Brüne (2003) found a correlation between the verbal IQ of schizophrenic subjects and their performance at ToM tasks; the correlation still existed when the IQ of the subjects and of the controls was matched. Generalizing from the literature, ToM performance appears to be affected, but not completely explained, by IQ (Garety & Freeman, 1999; Greig, Bryson, & Bell, 2004; Mitchley et al., 1998) .
In this regard, we also found that the education level of the schizophrenic subjects did not correlate with their global Th.o.m.a.s. score or with the scores at the individual scales, with the exception of scale D (Other-Me). Our instrument thus appears to reliably measure ToM capabilities and not education or intelligence. The correlation with scale D is probably due to the greater difficulty of the latter, which requires a second-order perspective and might therefore require intellectual skills beside ToM.
We then investigated the correlation between the subjects' scores at PANSS and at Th. These results are in line with those of Lysaker et al. (2005) , who applied the Metacognition Assessment Scale-originally developed for the evaluation of mentalization during psychotherapy (Semerari et al., 2003) -to the narratives of schizophrenic persons, finding that depressed mood, a general symptom, correlated with their ability to understand their own mind (first-person). Emotional withdrawal, a negative symptom, correlated with their ability to understand both their own mind and that of the others, while hallucinations, a positive symptom, correlated with their ability to understand their own mind but not with their ability to understand that of the others. Our results concerning the correlation with the negative symptoms are also in line with Langdon et al.(1997 Langdon et al.( , 2001 , who argued that the patients with prevailing negative symptoms are those whose ToM is impaired most severely.
On the whole, these results support the idea that positive and negative symptoms relate differently to different facets of ToM impairment.
A limitation of our study lies in the fact that we could not distinguish different sub-types of schizophrenic subjects so to explore whether their performances at Th.o.m.a.s. differ. Yet, according to the current literature different symptoms may relate to different ToM performances. In the same vein, it might be interesting to define the specific performance of each subtype of schizophrenia at the various Th.o.m.a.s. subscales and components.
Furthermore, studies in literature showed that schizophrenia is associated with deficits in communicative (Andreasen, Grove, & Hoffman, 1985; Frith & Allen, 1988) , mnestic and executive functioning abilities (Bryson, Whelahan, & Bell, 2001; Oram, Geffen, Geffen, Kavanagh, & McGrath, 2005; Silver, Feldman, Bilker, & Gur, 2003; Stirling, Hellewell, & Hewitt, 1997) . Further work could benefit from a more fine-grained assessment of these abilities, so to correlate a poor ToM performance with their possible impairment (see for example Lysaker et al., 2005) .
Overall, and given the complexity of the disorder investigated, we view this research as initial. Further, more in-depth examination is needed. However initial, though, our results show that ToM impairments may and do come in different types and degrees according to the domain considered: first-vs. third-person, first-vs. second-order, egocentric vs. allocentric, Awareness vs. Relation and Realization, etc. This appears to encourage this research direction to promote a more thorough understanding of this crucial and complex faculty and of its impairments.
Appendix A. The interview
This appendix contains the complete interview, divided into subscales. The numbers in parentheses indicate the position of each question in the evaluation grid (Appendix B). For the sake of this presentation, the questions have been reordered following the theoretical order in which they are discussed in the article; the actual order of presentation was: 1-1a-2-31-31a-32-11-11a-12-21-21a-22-3-3a-4-5-6-6a-33-33a-35-35a-34-37-38-13-13a-14-14a-15-15a-16-16a-23-23a-24-26-27-28-36-7-7a-8-8a-9-10-39-29-17-17a-18-19-20. Th.o.m.a.s. being a semi-structured interview means that the interviewee's replies may sometimes anticipate some questions that would have the subject of a specific question at a later point. Analogously, explanations and examples may or may not be spontaneously offered by the interviewee. Therefore, a certain redundancy exists in the interview as it is presented here; this serves to remind the interviewer to ask for all the information needed, unless it has been spontaneously provided by the interviewee.
A.1. Introduction
We are examining the idea of mind that each of us has. This study is being conducted on behalf of the University. To this purpose we have devised a series of questions aimed at understanding what is generally meant by ''mind". These questions cannot evaluate the interviewee's intelligence or personality. There are no correct or incorrect answers to them: each reply simply reflects each person's position in relation to the topic.
The questions are not meant to be inquisitive: when you are asked to give examples based on your personal experience, this is only done to help us understand exactly what you mean. You may refuse to answer any question if you so wish, and we shall end this interview at any moment if you become unwilling to continue.
We ask that you either reply sincerely or not at all: we prefer you to leave a blank space than to give an insincere reply. Finally, please do not hesitate to ask any explanations you may require about the meaning of the questions. You may take as much time as you need to answer the questions.
If you wish to ask me any question now, I will be pleased to answer it. Otherwise, we can start as soon as you are ready.
-is consistent with the question but has no concrete, meaningful example; -provides an example which is approximate, generic, meaningless, or only refers to behaviors instead of mental states or events; -is coherent and consistent, but generic, stereotyped or only slightly contextualized. 
C.5. Score = 4
A score of 4 is attributed to a reply which:
-is coherent, detailed and organized, with significant, coherent and contextualized examples; -refers in different ways to the interviewee's own mental states and events and to those of the others, thus providing not a generic or prototypical reply, but a contextualized one which bears a relation to the interviewee's personal experience. For example: (I) Do you experience emotions that make you feel good? (H) Well, certainly, emotions are the most important things you can experience in your life, therefore there are emotions that can be linked to feelings, to what you see, therefore if you go to a beautiful place that yields emotions in you. . . for example, last winter I went to Brazil, I spent New Year's Eve in Brazil and I experienced wonderful emotions concerning how the people are, how I fitted in, like an emotion of feeling love for someone or finding, let's say of falling in love with another person, that is to say there are many moments in which one feels emotions.
To obtain a score of 4, it is not necessary for the interviewee to provide an example based on her personal experience: it is sufficient that the reply is contextualized in a well detailed manner, that there are differentiations; thus, an invented example may suffice if it is meaningful and well contextualized.
